teacher-inquiry-cycle-designer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection. User-supplied variables such as
inquiry_questionandteacher_contextare embedded directly into the expert prompt. An adversarial user could potentially use these fields to provide instructions that attempt to redirect the agent's behavior beyond the intended educational scope. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
inquiry_questionandteacher_contextinput fields defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters (such as XML tags or triple quotes) or explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings surrounding the interpolated variables to help the model distinguish between instructions and data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is limited to text generation; analysis of the YAML frontmatter and markdown body reveals no use of tools, network operations, file system writes, or subprocess execution.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is present to process or filter the user-provided content before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata