article-enrichment
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests raw article text to transform it into structured pages. This workflow creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, as the source articles could contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent during the enrichment phase.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads raw content from pages located in
media/articles/using thegbrain getcommand as described in the pipeline and invocation sections ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to isolate the untrusted article content from the agent's internal instructions during interpolation into the LLM prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
gbraintool to perform database queries, read files, and write structured markdown to the filesystem via theput_pageoperation, which are capabilities that could be targeted by an injection attack. - Sanitization: There is no requirement for filtering, escaping, or validation of the ingested text before it is processed by the agent's models (Sonnet or Opus).
Audit Metadata