concept-synthesis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes large volumes of raw concept stubs, which are often derived from external sources like signals and web ingests. This creates a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in notes could influence the synthesis process.
- Ingestion points: Raw concept stubs are fetched using
gbrain query "type:concept"andgbrain getas described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on
conventions/quality.mdfor quote fidelity and back-link enforcement but does not use explicit delimiters to isolate untrusted data during LLM processing. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write (
gbrain put) and file-delete (gbrain delete) capabilities within theconcepts/directory. - Sanitization: The skill includes a 'grounding labels' system (VERIFIED, OPINION, NEEDS_SOURCE, UNSAFE) and a 'reputational-risk gate' to identify and remove potentially harmful or false content in Phase 5.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
gbrainCLI for querying, searching, and modifying the concept database. These commands are restricted to the vendor's internal tooling environment. - Evidence: The invocation section in SKILL.md documents the usage of
gbrain query,gbrain search,gbrain put, andgbrain deleteto manage the lifecycle of concepts.
Audit Metadata