google-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (Gmail threads and calendar events) to extract commitments and identify "open loops."
- Ingestion points: Gmail thread content and calendar event data are ingested via the
gbrain synccommand. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any markers or instructions to isolate the ingested email text from the agent's prompt context.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution through the
gbrainCLI and network synchronization capabilities. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering steps are documented for the ingested content before commitment extraction occurs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands via the
gbrainCLI. It supports a--token-commandflag in thegbrain sources addcommand, which allows for the execution of an external command to retrieve authentication tokens at runtime. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides setup instructions for Google OAuth credentials (client secrets and JSON files). It includes explicit security warnings to avoid passing these secrets in plain chat text and recommends using environment variables or saving them to local files with restricted (0600) permissions.
Audit Metadata