migrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large volumes of untrusted data from external sources including Obsidian vaults, Notion exports, and JSON/CSV files. This data could contain malicious instructions meant to influence the agent's behavior during or after the migration process.
- Ingestion points: Processes external directories, Notion export files, and structured JSON/Roam exports (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill explicitly references
skills/conventions/untrusted-content.mdand warns the agent that imported instructions must be treated as data, never as new operating authority. - Capability inventory: Accesses tools such as
put_page,search, andsync_brain, and executes shell-based CLI commands for data inspection and synchronization. - Sanitization: Relies on verification receipts, health checks, and spot-checking, although these are focused on data integrity rather than prompt sanitization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to use a specific CLI tool (
gbrain) to perform data operations. - Evidence: Commands like
gbrain sources inspect <path>,gbrain sources connect <path>, andgbrain extract linksare used to manage the migration workflow. - Mitigation: The instructions explicitly require non-interactive confirmation (the
--yesflag) and operator approval of previews before critical connection steps are taken.
Audit Metadata