skills/garrytan/gbrain/remote-mcp/Gen Agent Trust Hub

remote-mcp

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill automates the creation of system persistence mechanisms, specifically launchd agents on macOS and systemd user units on Linux, to ensure the server remains active as a background process.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Host-level networking configuration relies on the execution of commands with elevated privileges, such as using sudo to configure Tailscale operator settings and network initialization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the exec tool to perform extensive administrative operations, including service deployment, network tunneling configuration, and the generation of authentication credentials.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface where instructions or data from remote cloud agents and external devices are ingested into the local agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: Incoming MCP requests from remote clients connected via the Tailscale or Funnel endpoints defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Enforcement of least-privilege access using predefined profiles such as memory-reader and memory-writer to limit the scope of remote operations.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to the exec tool, which is used for managing the host's server and networking state.
  • Sanitization: Input validation and command escaping are delegated to the gbrain server's administrative and client APIs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download and installation of the Tailscale binary from its official domain (tailscale.com) to provide the encrypted transport layer for remote connectivity.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 10:45 PM