benchmark
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local utility binaries located in
~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/(e.g.,gstack-skill-start,gstack-learnings-log,gstack-skill-end) to manage session state, operational logging, and telemetry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from web pages.
- Ingestion points: Performance metrics and page data are read from the
Asidebrowser or a headless Chromium driver via theaside repland$Btools. - Boundary markers: The skill defines strict behavioral rules (Rule 5) requiring the agent to treat all browser-returned content as untrusted data, not instructions. The
$Btool also wraps content in explicitUNTRUSTED WEB CONTENTmarkers. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bashfor report organization andWritefor saving benchmark results. - Sanitization: Data extraction is restricted to specific JSON-serialized performance metrics via in-page JavaScript execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill mentions
aside.comas the official source for the Aside browser. It instructs the user to download and install the application manually rather than attempting to download it programmatically. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The preamble logic directs the agent to follow specific
GSTACK_INSTRUCTIONblocks for onboarding and consent workflows if they are emitted by the localgstack-skill-startbinary during session initialization.
Audit Metadata