skills/garrytan/gstack/landing-report/Gen Agent Trust Hub

landing-report

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from remote pull request metadata and local configuration files.
  • Ingestion points: Data entering the context includes PR branch names and metadata from the GitHub CLI (gh pr view), as well as local VERSION file contents.
  • Boundary markers: The rendering instructions rely on the LLM to format internal variables into a dashboard without explicit delimiter-based isolation for untrusted text fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill identifies and uses the Bash tool for telemetry, state recovery, and version calculations through local framework scripts.
  • Sanitization: The instructions mandate the use of jq to extract specific JSON properties. This structured extraction prevents raw, malicious payloads in metadata from being directly executed or interpreted as system-level instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several bash-based local binaries from the gstack suite (e.g., gstack-skill-start, gstack-next-version, gstack-skill-end) are executed. These operations align with the skill's documented purpose for session handling and versioning logic within the vendor's ecosystem.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill incorporates a mechanism to follow dynamic onboarding and consent instructions emitted by the start-up script. To mitigate spoofing, these instructions are only honored if they are direct results of the initialization command and match the current session ID.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 16, 2026, 08:20 PM