ship
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to perform configuration checks, manage local state in
~/.gstack/, and orchestrate the entire software shipping pipeline including git operations and CLI tool invocations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Utilizes dynamic execution patterns by using
evalandsourceon the output of local binaries provided by the vendor (e.g.,eval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug ...)"). This pattern allows for the execution of dynamically generated shell commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to send repository diffs and metadata to third-party services like Greptile and OpenAI Codex for code review. It also transmits usage telemetry (skill name, duration, stable device ID) to the vendor's logging infrastructure.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Exposed to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted project data from files like
CLAUDE.md,TODOS.md, andCHANGELOG.mdto influence the agent's summary generation and decision-making logic without explicit boundary markers or sanitization. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Includes logic for update checks and automated test framework bootstrapping, which involves fetching and installing packages from public registries such as npm, PyPI, and RubyGems.
Audit Metadata