skills/garrytan/gstack/ship/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ship

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to perform configuration checks, manage local state in ~/.gstack/, and orchestrate the entire software shipping pipeline including git operations and CLI tool invocations.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Utilizes dynamic execution patterns by using eval and source on the output of local binaries provided by the vendor (e.g., eval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug ...)"). This pattern allows for the execution of dynamically generated shell commands.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to send repository diffs and metadata to third-party services like Greptile and OpenAI Codex for code review. It also transmits usage telemetry (skill name, duration, stable device ID) to the vendor's logging infrastructure.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Exposed to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted project data from files like CLAUDE.md, TODOS.md, and CHANGELOG.md to influence the agent's summary generation and decision-making logic without explicit boundary markers or sanitization.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Includes logic for update checks and automated test framework bootstrapping, which involves fetching and installing packages from public registries such as npm, PyPI, and RubyGems.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 20, 2026, 05:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ship