capture-desktop

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands using arguments derived from user input. In Step 2, it runs python scripts/capture_desktop.py stage --input <tempfile> --title "<short title>". In Step 4, it executes bash ~/.claude-config-clone/scripts/sync-from-local.sh with a user-derived reason string. Finally, in Step 5, it performs git add, git commit, and git push operations. Executing shell commands with parameters derived from external data is a security risk.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive system configuration files located in ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. It then uses a shell script to reconcile and push these changes to a remote repository via Git. Accessing and exporting data from the user's home configuration directory represents a significant data exposure risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted content (pasted Desktop sessions) which then influences classification, routing logic, and the content of subsequent commands.
  • Ingestion points: Step 1 (pasted Desktop conversation content).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the skill instructions to distinguish pasted data from operational instructions.
  • Capability inventory: File system writes, shell script execution (python, bash), and network access via git push (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the pasted content before it is used to drive routing decisions and commit messages.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 8, 2026, 08:43 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — capture-desktop