capture-desktop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands using arguments derived from user input. In Step 2, it runs
python scripts/capture_desktop.py stage --input <tempfile> --title "<short title>". In Step 4, it executesbash ~/.claude-config-clone/scripts/sync-from-local.shwith a user-derived reason string. Finally, in Step 5, it performsgit add,git commit, andgit pushoperations. Executing shell commands with parameters derived from external data is a security risk. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive system configuration files located in
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. It then uses a shell script to reconcile and push these changes to a remote repository via Git. Accessing and exporting data from the user's home configuration directory represents a significant data exposure risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted content (pasted Desktop sessions) which then influences classification, routing logic, and the content of subsequent commands.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 (pasted Desktop conversation content).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the skill instructions to distinguish pasted data from operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system writes, shell script execution (
python,bash), and network access viagit push(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the pasted content before it is used to drive routing decisions and commit messages.
Audit Metadata