tor-procurement
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's 'Build mode' workflow requires the agent to copy a script template (
scripts/tor_docx.py), programmatically populate it with user-provided procurement details, and then execute the resulting Python file. This runtime generation and execution of code based on user-supplied parameters introduces a potential injection vector where malicious user input could be interpreted as code. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to use its environment to run the generated Python scripts to render
.docxdeliverables. While the template itself is local, the execution of dynamically generated code is a sensitive capability. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is exposed to indirect prompt injection in 'Review' and 'Finalise' modes when processing existing documents.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external content from Markdown files, Python scripts, and
.docxfiles (usingpython-docx) to perform reviews and edits. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters defined to separate untrusted document content from the agent's core instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the filesystem (via the
Edittool in 'Finalise' mode) and execute code ('Build' mode). - Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization, validation, or escaping procedures for the text extracted from external procurement documents.
Audit Metadata