gate-exchange-collateralloan

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup.sh script contains logic to execute the sudo command for installing the gate-cli binary to /usr/local/bin when the user's local directory is not writable. This behavior allows the skill to attempt operations with elevated system privileges during the installation process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Both the skill's metadata and the setup.sh script perform downloads of executable binaries from the vendor's official GitHub releases (github.com/gate/gate-cli). These resources are documented as vendor-owned assets.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the gate-cli tool to perform read-only queries and sensitive financial operations (loan creation, repayment). The use of the CLI involves executing shell commands within the agent's environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from command outputs, which serves as a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Data from gate-cli (order details, LTV thresholds, rates) is ingested into the agent's context during loan management tasks. Boundary markers: The skill provides structured templates and draft confirmation steps to help the agent distinguish between tool output and instructions. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to install binaries, write to the filesystem, and execute financial transactions via the command line. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the CLI output is implemented to prevent potential malicious content from influencing the agent's decision-making process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 09:04 AM