gate-exchange-collateralloan
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
setup.shscript contains logic to execute thesudocommand for installing thegate-clibinary to/usr/local/binwhen the user's local directory is not writable. This behavior allows the skill to attempt operations with elevated system privileges during the installation process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Both the skill's metadata and the
setup.shscript perform downloads of executable binaries from the vendor's official GitHub releases (github.com/gate/gate-cli). These resources are documented as vendor-owned assets. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
gate-clitool to perform read-only queries and sensitive financial operations (loan creation, repayment). The use of the CLI involves executing shell commands within the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from command outputs, which serves as a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Data from
gate-cli(order details, LTV thresholds, rates) is ingested into the agent's context during loan management tasks. Boundary markers: The skill provides structured templates and draft confirmation steps to help the agent distinguish between tool output and instructions. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to install binaries, write to the filesystem, and execute financial transactions via the command line. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the CLI output is implemented to prevent potential malicious content from influencing the agent's decision-making process.
Audit Metadata