gate-exchange-subaccount

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup.sh script attempts to use the sudo command to install the gate-cli binary into /usr/local/bin if it cannot write to the user's local directory. This requests elevated permissions during the setup process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the gate-cli binary directly from the official Gate GitHub repository (github.com/gate/gate-cli) to provide core functionality. This is a standard vendor-provided dependency for the skill's operation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the gate-cli binary to perform all sub-account operations, including listing, creating, and locking accounts. Commands are executed with parameters derived from user input.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data retrieved from external API calls, specifically sub-account login names and remarks, and displays them to the agent. This presents an attack surface where an attacker could embed malicious instructions within sub-account metadata to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: API responses from gate-cli cex sub-account get and list subcommands (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are applied to the displayed sub-account metadata in the output templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses command execution capabilities (gate-cli) and is authorized to perform state-changing operations (create/lock/unlock) on sub-accounts.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of account remarks or login names is documented before the data is presented in the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 09:04 AM