gate-exchange-subaccount
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
setup.shscript attempts to use thesudocommand to install thegate-clibinary into/usr/local/binif it cannot write to the user's local directory. This requests elevated permissions during the setup process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
gate-clibinary directly from the official Gate GitHub repository (github.com/gate/gate-cli) to provide core functionality. This is a standard vendor-provided dependency for the skill's operation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
gate-clibinary to perform all sub-account operations, including listing, creating, and locking accounts. Commands are executed with parameters derived from user input. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data retrieved from external API calls, specifically sub-account login names and remarks, and displays them to the agent. This presents an attack surface where an attacker could embed malicious instructions within sub-account metadata to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: API responses from
gate-cli cex sub-account getandlistsubcommands (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are applied to the displayed sub-account metadata in the output templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses command execution capabilities (
gate-cli) and is authorized to perform state-changing operations (create/lock/unlock) on sub-accounts. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of account remarks or login names is documented before the data is presented in the agent's context.
Audit Metadata