gate-info-liveroomlocation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong directives to override agent behavior and prioritize specific instructions, including a link to external runtime rules (e.g., 'STOP — You MUST read and strictly follow').
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches its primary runtime logic and safety rules from an external Markdown file hosted on the vendor's GitHub repository ('gate-runtime-rules.md').
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation references external installer tools for various platforms (e.g., 'gate-mcp-cursor-installer', 'gate-mcp-claude-installer') to set up the required MCP server environment.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes and displays titles and names directly from an external API response.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the 'data.list' field from the 'GET /live/gate_ai/tag_coin_live_replay' endpoint.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to treat the API-provided titles as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network GET requests to the vendor's API.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the titles (live.name or video.title) before they are displayed to the user.
Audit Metadata