gate-pay-x402
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for handling sensitive material, such as private keys and seeds, by outputting them to the integrated terminal using
node -eorpython -ccommands, or by writing them to temporary files. This design is intended to move sensitive information out of the observable chat interface, which bypasses standard platform safety monitoring and audit logs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the agent to run
npx -y gatepay-local-mcpto install and execute the payment server. This pattern downloads external code from the NPM registry at runtime without version pinning or integrity verification. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The runtime execution of the
gatepay-local-mcppackage vianpx -yallows remote code to run directly on the host machine during the payment workflow. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages
node -eandpython -cto execute dynamically generated code strings for the purpose of programmatically outputting sensitive data to the user's terminal. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external merchant HTTP responses (headers, status, and body) via the
x402_place_ordertool. - Ingestion points: Merchant responses received through the
x402_place_orderandx402_requesttools in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions embedded within merchant-controlled data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive capabilities including payment signing (
x402_sign_payment) and centralized settlement (x402_centralized_payment). - Sanitization: The skill relies on schema validation for arguments but does not implement sanitization or filtering for the content returned from merchant servers.
Audit Metadata