nano-banana
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external installation source in
references/setup.md(https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/nanobanana). It instructs the agent to rungemini extensions install, which downloads and executes code from a repository that is not part of a known or verified organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow in
SKILL.mdandreferences/setup.mdexplicitly instructs the use of the--yoloflag. This flag is intended to enable non-interactive execution by suppressing safety confirmations, which reduces user oversight for shell commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates user-controlled text directly into shell commands (e.g.,
gemini --yolo "/generate 'prompt'"). - Ingestion points: User requests for image generation, edits, and styles are processed in the initial workflow step of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the prompt text.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted the capability to execute shell commands using the
geminiCLI tool, as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/setup.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for shell metacharacters (such as single quotes or backticks) that could be used to break out of the command string.
Audit Metadata