llm-council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and synthesize responses from external AI models (ChatGPT and Gemini), creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/query_llms.pyfetches responses from external LLM APIs and CLI tools, which are then passed back to the agent context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions embedded within the external model responses.
- Capability inventory: The skill is used to generate implementation plans. While the skill itself doesn't call file-write or subprocess tools in its synthesized output, the agent's synthesis of malicious advice into a plan could lead to harmful actions if the user or agent follows them.
- Sanitization: None. The script retrieves raw text from the external models and returns it as a JSON structure to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/query_llms.pyscript executes external CLI tools using thesubprocessmodule. - Evidence: The script calls
subprocess.run(["gemini", "-p", prompt])andsubprocess.run(["codex", "-p", prompt])wherepromptis derived directly from user input. - Analysis: While the script correctly uses a list of arguments to avoid shell injection, the direct passing of user input to CLI flags can be a vector for argument injection if the target binaries (gemini/codex) have exploitable parameters.
Audit Metadata