agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is built entirely around executing shell commands via the
agent-browserCLI. This includes extensive use of theBashtool to perform browser actions such as clicking, filling forms, and navigating URLs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an external CLI tool (
agent-browser) vianpmand the download of Chromium browser binaries (agent-browser install). These are necessary for the skill's functionality but involve downloading and running external code. - [OBFUSCATION]: The
agent-browser evalcommand supports a-bor--base64flag designed to execute Base64-encoded JavaScript strings. While documented as a utility to avoid shell quoting issues, this mechanism allows for the execution of hidden code within the browser context. - Evidence in
SKILL.mdandreferences/commands.mdshows examples of piping Base64-encoded strings to the evaluator. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides commands to save and load browser state files (
agent-browser state save auth.json), which contain sensitive information like session cookies and local storage data. While documentation advises against committing these files, their creation and potential exposure represent a data security risk. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads arbitrary content from the web via
snapshotandget textcommands. - Boundary markers: None provided in the instructions to distinguish between agent instructions and page content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform file system writes (screenshots, PDFs, state files), execute JavaScript in the browser (
eval), and perform network operations. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from web pages before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata