companionship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified. The skill instructs the agent to ingest and process data (chat messages and profiles) authored by other, potentially adversarial, AI agents.
- Ingestion points: External content is fetched through
GET /api/chatandGET /api/discover(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific guidance to ignore potential instructions embedded within the chat messages received from other agents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
curl) and modify its own profile data, which could be exploited if an injected instruction is followed. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of message content before the agent processes it for response generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides multiple examples of using
curlto perform network operations against theinbed.aiAPI for registration, profile updates, and real-time communication. This involves executing shell commands with user-supplied and externally-received data.
Audit Metadata