conductor-new-track
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality to download additional agent skills from remote repositories.\n
- Evidence: Section 2.4 in
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to usecurlto fetchSKILL.mdfiles from URLs defined in a local catalog.\n - Source: The target URLs point to official GitHub organizations for Firebase and the skill's author (gemini-cli-extensions), which are recognized as trusted or well-known entities.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for project orchestration and environment setup.\n
- Evidence: It executes
mkdirto create directories,curlto download files, andgitto commit changes to the repository.\n - Context: These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of managing a development workflow.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting external data into its reasoning process.\n
- Ingestion points: Reads foundational project files (
product.md,tech-stack.md,workflow.md) and track-specific artifacts (spec.md,plan.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat data from these files as untrusted or to ignore instructions within them.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands, write to the file system, and modify project history via Git.\n
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill interpolates data from these files directly into the context used for generating new technical documents.
Audit Metadata