conductor-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user prompts regarding project goals and from existing codebase files during brownfield analysis. This data is incorporated into generated documentation like
product.mdwithout explicit sanitization. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Project Goal prompt in Section 2 and codebase architecture scan for brownfield projects). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are defined to isolate processed external content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
git,curl,mkdir,python3) and perform filesystem write operations. - Sanitization: No instructions are provided for filtering, escaping, or validating the external inputs before interpolation into prompt contexts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves agent skill files from remote repositories using
curlas part of its automated setup process. - Evidence: Section 2.6 of
SKILL.mdoutlines a workflow for downloadingSKILL.mdfiles to the local.agents/skills/directory. - Sources: The downloads target the official Firebase GitHub organization and the author's own extension repositories, both of which are recognized as reputable sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local system utilities to perform project initialization and state management.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runpython3 scripts/resume.pyto check state and variousgitcommands (init,status,ls-files,add,commit,notes) to manage project scaffolding.
Audit Metadata