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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data via
image_urlandaudio_urlfields. These assets are untrusted and could potentially contain embedded instructions (e.g., text in images or commands in audio) designed to influence the behavior of the generative models. - Ingestion points: Assets are ingested via the
--inputJSON payload in commands likeruncomfy run bytedance/omnihuman/apias seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON to pass parameters to the CLI, providing a structural boundary, but it relies on the agent to distinguish between user intent and data content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via the
runcomfytool and write files to the local system using the--output-dirflag. - Sanitization: The skill documentation includes a dedicated security section that warns about these risks and advises agents to only ingest URLs explicitly provided by the user.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of the
runcomfyCLI tool. It defines the allowed scope usingallowed-tools: Bash(runcomfy *), which limits the agent to the vendor's specific toolset. It also manages sensitive local files like~/.config/runcomfy/token.jsonfor authentication, which is standard behavior for the associated service.
Audit Metadata