nano-banana-edit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data by accepting up to 20 image URLs via the
image_urlsparameter. As acknowledged in the skill's security section, these images are fetched by the remote model server and represent a surface for image-based prompt injection or adversarial content designed to influence the model's behavior. - Ingestion points:
image_urlsarray in thegoogle/nano-banana-2/editendpoint defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation includes a dedicated "Security & Privacy" section that warns users to treat external URLs as untrusted and identifies image-based prompt injection as a known risk.
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes the
runcomfyCLI to perform operations and writes generated output files to a user-defined local directory via the--output-dirargument. - Sanitization: The documentation states the CLI transmits the JSON body directly to the API without shell-expanding the prompt, providing protection against command injection, though it does not perform content validation on the source images themselves.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to invoke the
@runcomfy/clitool using theruncomfy runcommand. It constructs a command-line call that passes user-supplied prompts and image references as a JSON payload to thegoogle/nano-banana-2/editendpoint. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions require the installation of the
@runcomfy/clipackage from the npm registry. Additionally, during execution, the tool fetches generated image assets from the*.runcomfy.netand*.runcomfy.comdomains to save them to the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata