seedance-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external media files (images, videos, and audio) via user-supplied URLs. These assets are passed to a remote model and could potentially contain adversarial content intended to influence the agent or the underlying model's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
image_url,video_url, andaudio_urlfields in the input schema for thebytedance/seedance-v2/promodel. - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes JSON-structured input when calling the local CLI, providing a degree of separation between data and command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
runcomfyCLI to submit generation requests and downloads results to a specified local directory. - Sanitization: Documentation states that the CLI does not perform shell expansion on the prompt, but there is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the external media files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct users to install the
@runcomfy/clipackage from NPM and to add the skill from theagentspace-so/runcomfy-skillsrepository on GitHub. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
runcomfycommand-line tool locally to interface with the model API and manage file downloads.
Audit Metadata