agkan-icebox
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands using the
agkanCLI tool andjqfor configuration management and task retrieval. - Evidence:
CONFIG=$(agkan config get --json 2>/dev/null || echo '{}')andagkan task list --status icebox --jsoninSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves untrusted data from task titles and bodies and interpolates them directly into a sub-agent prompt, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Task data is fetched via
agkan task listandagkan task getinSKILL.md(Steps 1 and 2). - Boundary markers: The prompt uses basic Markdown headers (
## Task Information) but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the sub-agent to ignore potential commands embedded within the task body. - Capability inventory: The workflow involves shell command execution via the
agkanCLI and delegation to sub-agents which follow procedures inagkan-icebox-subtask-SKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the interpolated
<body>or<title>variables before they are passed to the sub-agent prompt.
Audit Metadata