release
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading and acting upon content from project files, which creates a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads version information from
.claude-plugin/plugin.jsonand parses theCHANGELOG.mdfile. It is also expected to analyze recent changes (e.g., commit messages or diffs) to determine the appropriate version bump type (patch, minor, or major). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or system-level directives that would prevent the agent from following malicious instructions hidden within the changelog or plugin metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
jq,git), file system modification (editing version and changelog files), and network operations viagit pushto the remote repository. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization logic is implemented to ensure that the content read from the project files does not contain prompt injection attacks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands to automate the development workflow.
- Evidence: The skill uses
jqfor JSON parsing andgitfor version control operations (add, commit, tag, push). These tools are used for their intended purpose in a software release context.
Audit Metadata