deep-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest, scrape, and synthesize content from 15-25 external URLs, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Findings from these untrusted sources are integrated into a final research report without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Web content via Firecrawl (
scrape,crawl), Google Search (search_web), and GitHub repository content (get_file_contents). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the scraped content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for network access, local file writing (
research_report.md,.agent/state/last-run.json), and image generation. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering logic is provided for the content extracted from external URLs.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides specific shell and Python code snippets in its reference documentation (
references/research-heuristics.md) for the agent to use when processing binary files like DOCX. - Evidence: The file contains a shell pipeline (
unzip -p ... | sed ...) and a Python script usingzipfileandElementTreefor extraction. While these are standard utility patterns, they encourage the agent to construct and execute code at runtime to handle potentially untrusted local files. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with the Agentic OS shared-memory model by reading and updating
.agent/state/last-run.json. While this is a standard platform integration for state management, it involves accessing internal agent metadata. No credentials or non-whitelisted exfiltration domains were detected.
Audit Metadata