internal-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external sources including Slack, email, and Google Drive, which are potentially attacker-controlled.
  • Ingestion points: The instructions in examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, and examples/faq-answers.md direct the agent to use tools to read Slack posts, emails, and shared documents.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate untrusted content or warn the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is primarily focused on text generation and drafting. It does not exhibit capabilities for file-system modification or arbitrary command execution.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization for the data retrieved from external communication tools.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions encourage the agent to access and summarize sensitive organizational information from internal data sources.
  • The agent is prompted to search for "critical team members" docs, "leadership updates," and Slack messages in "large channels" or "announce channels" (examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md).
  • Accessing these sources is central to the skill's function, but it creates a vector for exposing sensitive internal data within the generated drafts if the output is not carefully reviewed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — internal-comms