internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external sources including Slack, email, and Google Drive, which are potentially attacker-controlled.
- Ingestion points: The instructions in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mddirect the agent to use tools to read Slack posts, emails, and shared documents. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate untrusted content or warn the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is primarily focused on text generation and drafting. It does not exhibit capabilities for file-system modification or arbitrary command execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization for the data retrieved from external communication tools.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions encourage the agent to access and summarize sensitive organizational information from internal data sources.
- The agent is prompted to search for "critical team members" docs, "leadership updates," and Slack messages in "large channels" or "announce channels" (
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md). - Accessing these sources is central to the skill's function, but it creates a vector for exposing sensitive internal data within the generated drafts if the output is not carefully reviewed.
Audit Metadata