local-vault

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its metadata enrichment feature in scripts/sync.py. It reads content from untrusted local documents and feeds it into a prompt for the Claude CLI to generate summaries and tags.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted file content is read from the user-configured KB_SOURCE_DIR in scripts/sync.py.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template uses ---DOCUMENT HEAD--- and ---END--- delimiters to isolate document content from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The injection surface is limited to writing metadata into the frontmatter of Markdown files; no high-risk system commands are triggered by the LLM output.
  • Sanitization: The script removes Markdown code fences from the LLM output before updating the vault files.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests and downloads as part of its document processing pipeline.
  • Interacts with the MinerU API (mineru.net) for cloud-based OCR and document conversion fallback when local tools are insufficient.
  • Installs Python packages and downloads machine learning models (Whisper) from Hugging Face repositories at runtime upon user consent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses subprocess calls to coordinate several local utilities and generators.
  • Invokes pandoc for document format conversion and ffmpeg for audio processing.
  • Shells out to the claude CLI for document OCR and frontmatter enrichment.
  • Automatically generates and writes a sync.command shell script to the local filesystem on macOS to provide a clickable sync entry point.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 06:39 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — local-vault