local-vault
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its metadata enrichment feature in
scripts/sync.py. It reads content from untrusted local documents and feeds it into a prompt for the Claude CLI to generate summaries and tags. - Ingestion points: Untrusted file content is read from the user-configured
KB_SOURCE_DIRinscripts/sync.py. - Boundary markers: The prompt template uses
---DOCUMENT HEAD---and---END---delimiters to isolate document content from instructions. - Capability inventory: The injection surface is limited to writing metadata into the frontmatter of Markdown files; no high-risk system commands are triggered by the LLM output.
- Sanitization: The script removes Markdown code fences from the LLM output before updating the vault files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests and downloads as part of its document processing pipeline.
- Interacts with the MinerU API (
mineru.net) for cloud-based OCR and document conversion fallback when local tools are insufficient. - Installs Python packages and downloads machine learning models (Whisper) from Hugging Face repositories at runtime upon user consent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses subprocess calls to coordinate several local utilities and generators.
- Invokes
pandocfor document format conversion andffmpegfor audio processing. - Shells out to the
claudeCLI for document OCR and frontmatter enrichment. - Automatically generates and writes a
sync.commandshell script to the local filesystem on macOS to provide a clickable sync entry point.
Audit Metadata