ace-step
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted audio files provided via URL for inpainting and outpainting tasks.
- Ingestion points: The
audioparameter in the input JSON for theacestep-ai/ace-step/audio-inpaintandacestep-ai/ace-step/audio-outpaintendpoints (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON for inputs, though it lacks explicit instructions to the underlying model to ignore content embedded within the audio files.
- Capability inventory: The skill relies on the
runcomfyCLI (command execution) to interact with remote model APIs. - Sanitization: The documentation explicitly states that the CLI does not perform shell expansion on input content, which mitigates direct shell injection risks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality is delivered through the execution of the
runcomfyCLI tool. - Evidence: The skill provides multiple examples of invoking
runcomfy runwith various model paths and JSON inputs to generate audio. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the necessary CLI tool from a public package registry.
- Evidence: The installation steps recommend
npm i -g @runcomfy/clior usingnpx -y @runcomfy/cli --version. These downloads target the official NPM registry, which is a well-known service.
Audit Metadata