comment-writer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, such as GitHub PRs, issues, and Slack/Discord messages, to generate collaboration comments. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in those sources could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill triggers on PR feedback, issue replies, and chat messages. Specifically, the
gh pr viewcommand inSKILL.mdfetches title, body, and code changes from GitHub. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters telling the agent to ignore or isolate instructions that might be contained within the external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
gh(GitHub CLI) tool to execute commands and retrieve remote data. - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation steps are defined for the incoming text before the agent applies the Voice Rules.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI to inspect pull requests.
- Evidence:
gh pr view <PR_NUMBER> --json title,body,additions,deletions,changedFilesinSKILL.mdallows the agent to execute shell commands to interact with GitHub repositories.
Audit Metadata