cycle

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from Pull Request comments and incorporates it into instructions for automated agents.\n
  • Ingestion points: templates/lead-monitoring-loop.md reads review comments from GitHub using the gh api.\n
  • Boundary markers: Comments are interpolated into templates/pr-agent-prompt.md using the {{COMMENT_LIST}} placeholder without sufficient isolation or instructions to ignore instructions embedded in the comments.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agents receiving these prompts have the authority to modify source code, commit changes, push to remote repositories, and interact with the GitHub API via the CLI.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or schema validation for the ingested comment text before it is used in prompt construction.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local shell command execution for its core functionality.\n
  • Utilizes git worktree for environment management and standard git commands for branch management and commits.\n
  • Uses the gh CLI for extensive interaction with the GitHub API to poll PR status and post replies.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the flow of repository data and review metadata between the local environment and GitHub.\n
  • Reads code and private PR discussion metadata.\n
  • Transmits modified code and automated responses to the origin GitHub repository.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 11:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cycle