cycle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from Pull Request comments and incorporates it into instructions for automated agents.\n
- Ingestion points:
templates/lead-monitoring-loop.mdreads review comments from GitHub using thegh api.\n - Boundary markers: Comments are interpolated into
templates/pr-agent-prompt.mdusing the{{COMMENT_LIST}}placeholder without sufficient isolation or instructions to ignore instructions embedded in the comments.\n - Capability inventory: The agents receiving these prompts have the authority to modify source code, commit changes, push to remote repositories, and interact with the GitHub API via the CLI.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or schema validation for the ingested comment text before it is used in prompt construction.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local shell command execution for its core functionality.\n
- Utilizes
git worktreefor environment management and standardgitcommands for branch management and commits.\n - Uses the
ghCLI for extensive interaction with the GitHub API to poll PR status and post replies.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the flow of repository data and review metadata between the local environment and GitHub.\n - Reads code and private PR discussion metadata.\n
- Transmits modified code and automated responses to the origin GitHub repository.
Audit Metadata