pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious documents could attempt to influence the agent's logic. This is a common characteristic of document manipulation tools.
  • Ingestion points: PDF files are parsed in scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, and scripts/check_fillable_fields.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; extracted text is not delimited with specific warnings to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write PDF files using pypdf and execute command-line tools.
  • Sanitization: No specific filtering or escaping is applied to extracted text before it is returned to the agent context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The toolkit references and provides instructions for using standard external command-line utilities for PDF operations, such as qpdf, pdftotext, pdftoppm, and pdftk. These are industry-standard tools used for their intended purpose.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py implements a targeted monkeypatch of the pypdf library to resolve a specific handling issue with selection list fields. This runtime modification is limited to internal library logic and does not involve executing untrusted or remote code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 30, 2026, 11:32 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdf