Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious documents could attempt to influence the agent's logic. This is a common characteristic of document manipulation tools.
- Ingestion points: PDF files are parsed in
scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, andscripts/check_fillable_fields.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; extracted text is not delimited with specific warnings to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write PDF files using
pypdfand execute command-line tools. - Sanitization: No specific filtering or escaping is applied to extracted text before it is returned to the agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The toolkit references and provides instructions for using standard external command-line utilities for PDF operations, such as
qpdf,pdftotext,pdftoppm, andpdftk. These are industry-standard tools used for their intended purpose. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a targeted monkeypatch of thepypdflibrary to resolve a specific handling issue with selection list fields. This runtime modification is limited to internal library logic and does not involve executing untrusted or remote code.
Audit Metadata