quickstart

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads a shell script from 'https://basic-anteater-667.convex.site/quickstart-bootstrap' to a temporary directory ('/tmp/convex-qb.sh') and subsequently executes it using 'bash'. While the domain is associated with the vendor, the execution of remote code is a high-privilege action.
  • [OBFUSCATION]: The instructions include a specific evasion technique to bypass security classifiers. It directs the AI to split the download ('curl') and execution ('bash') into separate shell calls, explicitly stating that this is done because a single command combining both is a pattern that safety classifiers block. This demonstrates an intentional attempt to evade security oversight.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch a 'personalized runbook' from a remote URL ('https://basic-anteater-667.convex.site/q/.md') and follow it as the 'canonical rule set'. This allows remote content not present in the skill's source code to control the agent's behavior and logic during the session.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches Markdown content from an external URL after an initial telemetry handshake.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The skill is told the remote runbook is the 'complete, current rule set' and should be followed over the skill's own summary.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands, perform network requests, write files to the filesystem, and invoke subagents.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote runbook content is performed before the agent adopts its instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 02:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — quickstart