deepline-analytics
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions provide a resolution path that executes a binary located within the local workspace directory. Executing binaries from a workspace path is a security risk as the workspace contents could be manipulated by external contributors or malicious actors.
- Evidence: SKILL.md instructs to use
<workspace-root>/.deepline/runtime/bin/deeplineif the global command is missing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill prompts for the installation of a package from a non-standard third-party NPM registry rather than the public registry.
- Evidence: SKILL.md contains the installation command
npm install -g deepline --registry https://code.deepline.com/api/v2/npm/. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes data from external analytics platforms, including Snowflake warehouse tables and Axiom production logs, which are potential vectors for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Snowflake tables (e.g.,
AERO_DB.CONVEX_RAW.PLAY_RUNS,AERO_DB.CONVEX.USAGE_EVENTS) and Axiom logs (verceldataset) described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the processing instructions for external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute commands via the
deeplineCLI and perform network operations to retrieve analytics data. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are described for data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata