deepline-gtm
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMOBFUSCATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [OBFUSCATION]: The
scripts/clay-to-deepline.mjsscript contains ahideSpecifiersfunction that uses Unicode escapes to replace JavaScript keywords likeimport,from, andrequirewith encoded versions (e.g.,\u0069mport). This is used when generating migration modules to hide these keywords from static analysis scans. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates JavaScript modules (
.clay.jsfiles) based on formulas extracted from the Clay platform and dynamically loads them usingimport()during its parity verification phase. It also uses thenew Function()constructor to evaluate code strings at runtime during self-tests. The core workflow involves generating TypeScript 'play' files which are subsequently executed in the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes large volumes of untrusted external data, including social media profiles, company website content, and complex platform exports. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection, particularly as the skill has capabilities for network operations, database writes, and CRM integration.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts in the skill, such as
scripts/clay-to-deepline.mjsandscripts/claude-deepline-statusline.mjs, usechild_process(execSync, spawn) to execute external binaries.scripts/claude-deepline-statusline.mjsspecifically executes commands defined in a user-controlled local file (~/.claude/statusline-user-command.txt). - [PERSISTENCE]: The
scripts/claude-deepline-statusline.mjsscript maintains state across agent sessions by writing data to~/.claude/deepline-statusline-state.json.
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