alby-bitcoin-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from untrusted external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through BOLT-11 invoices, LNURL strings, and lightning addresses processed by components like
bc-pay-button(references/bitcoin-connect/bitcoin-connect.md) and functions likerequestInvoice(references/lightning-tools/lnurl.md). - Boundary markers: The provided code templates do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within user-supplied payment strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent significant capabilities, including network access via Nostr relays, payment settlement via the
NWCClient(references/nwc-client/nwc-client.md), and automated HTTP 402 challenge handling viafetch402(references/lightning-tools/402.md). - Sanitization: While the skill validates cryptographic formats (e.g., payment hashes), it does not sanitize descriptive text or success messages which could be manipulated to influence agent behavior.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references and utilizes external code and services.
- Evidence: The skill instructs users to install NPM packages from the
@getalbyscope and suggests fetching web components from the well-knownesm.shCDN (references/bitcoin-connect/bitcoin-connect.md). - Evidence: Automated testing scripts reference the
faucet.nwc.devservice to programmatically generate test wallets (references/automated-testing.md). These are established resources within the vendor's ecosystem.
Audit Metadata