skill-miner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill scans local session logs from Claude Code, OpenCode, and Codex platforms (e.g.,
~/.claude/projects,~/.local/share/opencode). These logs contain full conversation history and potential sensitive user data. Extracted clusters and 'evidence' snippets are sent to remote LLM APIs (Claude and Codex CLIs) for clustering and scoring. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches skill content from
raw.githubusercontent.comusingcurl. It also performs searches on external registries vianpx(e.g.,@floomhq/skillsandskillspackage). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses
subprocess.runto execute multiple external CLI tools includingnpx,curl,claude, andcodex. It also usesos.popenwithin its test suite to run local scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcript data from user sessions and interpolates it into prompts for LLM clustering and scoring.
- Ingestion points: Session logs found in
~/.claude/projects,~/.local/share/opencode, and~/.codex/sessions(implemented insources.py). - Boundary markers: Uses basic delimiters and quotes to wrap evidence, but lacks rigorous separation between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: System command execution via
subprocess.runand file writing capabilities indraft.pyandscore.py. - Sanitization: Implements basic truncation for snippets (
MAX_SNIPPET= 220 chars) and inputs (MAX_INPUT= 2000 chars). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
draft.pyscript dynamically generates new agent instructions (SKILL.md) based on output provided by a remote LLM. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Documentation in
mine.pysuggests usingsudoto access session logs in restricted system directories (e.g.,/root/.claude/projects).
Audit Metadata