retro
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly within shell script blocks inSKILL.md. In Step 1, it assignsdays="${ARGUMENTS:-7}"and subsequently uses this variable in Step 2 within a subshell:$(date -v-${days}d ...). If the input provided to$ARGUMENTScontains shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data originating from git commit messages and GitHub pull request metadata, which can be controlled by external contributors.
- Ingestion points:
git logandgh pr listcommands inSKILL.md(Step 2) andreferences/analysis.md(Steps 4, 6, 7). - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or explicit instructions provided to the agent to treat the ingested git data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (
git,gh,wc,sed) and perform file system operations (mkdirin Step 14) across both files. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the text retrieved from commit logs or PR titles before the Engineering Manager persona analyzes it.
Audit Metadata