warden-sweep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses prompt templates in
references/verify-prompt.mdandreferences/patch-prompt.mdto instruct subagents during the verification and patching phases. These templates interpolate finding titles, descriptions, and code snippets directly from the repository being scanned. This creates an attack surface where a malicious file in the target codebase could influence subagent behavior by embedding instructions in findings generated by the scanner. - Ingestion points: Findings extracted from Warden logs in
.warden/logs/and stored indata/all-findings.jsonlanddata/verified.jsonl. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates use markdown headers to structure data but lack explicit delimiters or instructions for the subagent to ignore potentially malicious content within the interpolated fields.
- Capability inventory: Subagents are tasked with file reads and code modifications, while the main agent can execute git commands and create GitHub Pull Requests based on subagent output.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the findings data before it is interpolated into the subagent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system commands such as
git,gh(GitHub CLI),warden, anduvto automate the sweep process. These calls are implemented using Python'ssubprocess.runwith argument lists rather than shell strings, which mitigates common command injection risks. These operations are essential to the primary function of the skill. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/scan.pyfile declares a dependency ontomli, a widely-used and well-known Python library for TOML parsing, which is managed via theuvtool's script metadata.
Audit Metadata