backport-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several shell-based tools including git, gh (GitHub CLI), and yarn. It executes sequences for branch management, cherry-picking, committing, pushing, and creating pull requests. It also runs project scripts like yarn format, yarn lint:fix, and yarn build:dev.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR metadata (titles, bodies, and commit messages) from GitHub using the gh pr view command (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat the ingested data as untrusted text.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to modify the local file system (git cherry-pick), execute project-defined code (yarn build:dev), and perform network operations (git push, gh pr create).
  • Sanitization: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to pass user-provided inputs, such as the PR identifier, "unchanged" into shell commands (gh pr view <PR>). This practice can lead to command injection if the execution environment does not provide automatic shell escaping for the <PR> variable. Furthermore, PR titles are directly interpolated into git commit and gh pr create titles without sanitization.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes build and linting scripts (yarn build:dev, yarn lint:fix) on code that has been cherry-picked from a merged pull request. Although the source is the repository's own merged history, this involves executing code that could contain malicious changes if the upstream branch was compromised.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 08:54 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — backport-pr