backport-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several shell-based tools including
git,gh(GitHub CLI), andyarn. It executes sequences for branch management, cherry-picking, committing, pushing, and creating pull requests. It also runs project scripts likeyarn format,yarn lint:fix, andyarn build:dev. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR metadata (titles, bodies, and commit messages) from GitHub using the
gh pr viewcommand (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat the ingested data as untrusted text.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to modify the local file system (
git cherry-pick), execute project-defined code (yarn build:dev), and perform network operations (git push,gh pr create). - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to pass user-provided inputs, such as the PR identifier, "unchanged" into shell commands (
gh pr view <PR>). This practice can lead to command injection if the execution environment does not provide automatic shell escaping for the<PR>variable. Furthermore, PR titles are directly interpolated intogit commitandgh pr createtitles without sanitization. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes build and linting scripts (
yarn build:dev,yarn lint:fix) on code that has been cherry-picked from a merged pull request. Although the source is the repository's own merged history, this involves executing code that could contain malicious changes if the upstream branch was compromised.
Audit Metadata