skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.Popenandsubprocess.runwithinscripts/run_eval.pyandscripts/improve_description.pyto invoke theclaudeCLI and other internal scripts for evaluation and description optimization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data such as user feedback and subagent execution results, creating an attack surface where malicious input could influence the agent's behavior during skill improvement.
- Ingestion points: Feedback provided via the
feedback.jsonfile (generated by the viewer) and outputs fromclaude -pruns are used to refine skill instructions. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict delimiters when interpolating untrusted feedback into prompts for the improvement model.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess, perform local file writes, and start a local web server. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or escaping of feedback data before it is included in model prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
eval-viewer/viewer.htmlfile loads the SheetJS library (xlsx.full.min.js) fromcdn.sheetjs.comto enable spreadsheet rendering in the review interface. This is a reference to a well-known service for document processing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
scripts/run_eval.pydynamically generates skill definition files in the.claude/commands/directory. These files are then interpreted and executed by theclaudeCLI to simulate and test triggering behavior. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]:
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyimplements a local HTTP server that binds to127.0.0.1. This server is used to host the evaluation results viewer and capture user feedback locally.
Audit Metadata