skills/getsentry/sentry/scraps-review/Gen Agent Trust Hub

scraps-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the GitHub CLI (gh) and the Python runner uv to manage pull request metadata.
  • Subprocess calls in scripts/classify_pr_files.py use argument lists rather than shell strings, which is a standard security practice to prevent shell injection.
  • The mark_files_viewed function utilizes the gh api graphql -f flag to pass path variables, protecting against injection in the GraphQL query structure.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of pull request paths and diff patches from the getsentry/sentry repository.
  • The classification logic is handled entirely by a Python script using regular expressions, bypassing LLM-based decision making for the core classification task.
  • A mandatory human-in-the-loop confirmation is required before any state-changing action (marking files as viewed) is performed.
  • An 'approval token' mechanism (SHA-256 hash of the PR state and proposed noise set) ensures that the mutation only acts on the exact file set reviewed and approved by the user.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with the GitHub API to read and write pull request status.
  • Execution is restricted to the getsentry/sentry repository via URL and PR number validation in the resolve_pr function.
  • The skill does not access sensitive local credentials (other than utilizing the existing gh authentication) or communicate with unauthorized external domains.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 07:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — scraps-review