scraps-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the GitHub CLI (
gh) and the Python runneruvto manage pull request metadata. - Subprocess calls in
scripts/classify_pr_files.pyuse argument lists rather than shell strings, which is a standard security practice to prevent shell injection. - The
mark_files_viewedfunction utilizes thegh api graphql-fflag to pass path variables, protecting against injection in the GraphQL query structure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of pull request paths and diff patches from the
getsentry/sentryrepository. - The classification logic is handled entirely by a Python script using regular expressions, bypassing LLM-based decision making for the core classification task.
- A mandatory human-in-the-loop confirmation is required before any state-changing action (marking files as viewed) is performed.
- An 'approval token' mechanism (SHA-256 hash of the PR state and proposed noise set) ensures that the mutation only acts on the exact file set reviewed and approved by the user.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with the GitHub API to read and write pull request status.
- Execution is restricted to the
getsentry/sentryrepository via URL and PR number validation in theresolve_prfunction. - The skill does not access sensitive local credentials (other than utilizing the existing
ghauthentication) or communicate with unauthorized external domains.
Audit Metadata