taskhold
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task descriptions and notes from the Taskhold remote service and configuration from user-provided setup URLs. This content serves as instructions for the agent, creating a surface where malicious tasks could attempt to override agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The tools
taskhold_listandtaskhold_getinSKILL.mdretrieve external data, and the instructions direct the agent to fetch a user-supplied setup URL. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or guardrails to isolate task content from the agent's core instructions, increasing the risk of the agent following instructions embedded within a task.
- Capability inventory: The agent performs repository modifications and coding tasks based on the input and has the ability to write data back to the remote server via
taskhold_add_noteandtaskhold_create. - Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization is present, although the skill provides natural language warnings to the agent not to store secrets in the task list.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches setup configuration and API keys from a URL provided by the user. It also communicates with
taskhold.comto synchronize the task list. These network operations are intrinsic to the service provided by the vendor. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tools
taskhold_add_note,taskhold_create, andtaskhold_completetransmit local project context (such as task summaries and notes) to the remote Taskhold server. While this is the primary function of the skill, it establishes a data flow from the local environment to an external service. The skill includes explicit instructions to avoid putting secrets or large code blocks into tasks to mitigate this risk.
Audit Metadata