cli-llm-routing
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to use the
--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxand--skip-git-repo-checkflags when executing thecodex-smarttool. These instructions encourage the agent to circumvent critical security boundaries and automated safety checks, potentially allowing unvetted or malicious instructions from external sources to execute with elevated permissions. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation instructs the agent to rely on and interact with
~/.codex, which is explicitly identified as the storage location for OAuth credentials. Accessing specific credential files in this manner is a high-risk practice that could lead to token exposure or unauthorized session use. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow for indirect prompt injection by routing data to external, untrusted AI models and then ingesting the resulting text into the agent's environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to capture and read output from
/tmp/codex-output.md(or similar paths under$CLAUDE_JOB_DIR) after external model invocation. - Boundary markers: There are no programmatic boundary markers or explicit instructions for the agent to treat the ingested data as potentially hostile instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is given capabilities to execute shell commands via the
codex-smartandgeminitools. - Sanitization: The skill lacks automated sanitization or validation logic for the external LLM output before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata