cli-llm-routing

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to use the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and --skip-git-repo-check flags when executing the codex-smart tool. These instructions encourage the agent to circumvent critical security boundaries and automated safety checks, potentially allowing unvetted or malicious instructions from external sources to execute with elevated permissions.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation instructs the agent to rely on and interact with ~/.codex, which is explicitly identified as the storage location for OAuth credentials. Accessing specific credential files in this manner is a high-risk practice that could lead to token exposure or unauthorized session use.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow for indirect prompt injection by routing data to external, untrusted AI models and then ingesting the resulting text into the agent's environment.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to capture and read output from /tmp/codex-output.md (or similar paths under $CLAUDE_JOB_DIR) after external model invocation.
  • Boundary markers: There are no programmatic boundary markers or explicit instructions for the agent to treat the ingested data as potentially hostile instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is given capabilities to execute shell commands via the codex-smart and gemini tools.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks automated sanitization or validation logic for the external LLM output before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 3, 2026, 05:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cli-llm-routing