pm-thread-to-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Retrieves content from ClickUp, Slack, Linear, and GitHub URLs, as well as pasted meeting transcripts or discussion buffers (SKILL.md Step 1).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' directives to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested thread content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for data fetching and theAgenttool for spawning downstream workers viaao spawn(SKILL.md Step 6). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or sanitization of the discussion data before it is incorporated into the technical specifications and verification protocols.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to run a local Python script for ClickUp retrieval and the GitHub CLI (gh) for accessing issue metadata. It also generates anao spawncommand intended to initiate autonomous agent tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to well-known service APIs, including ClickUp, GitHub, and Linear, to retrieve discussion data required for generating product specifications.
Audit Metadata