pm-thread-to-spec

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Retrieves content from ClickUp, Slack, Linear, and GitHub URLs, as well as pasted meeting transcripts or discussion buffers (SKILL.md Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' directives to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested thread content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool for data fetching and the Agent tool for spawning downstream workers via ao spawn (SKILL.md Step 6).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or sanitization of the discussion data before it is incorporated into the technical specifications and verification protocols.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to run a local Python script for ClickUp retrieval and the GitHub CLI (gh) for accessing issue metadata. It also generates an ao spawn command intended to initiate autonomous agent tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to well-known service APIs, including ClickUp, GitHub, and Linear, to retrieve discussion data required for generating product specifications.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 3, 2026, 05:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pm-thread-to-spec