ship
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Nov 19, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The visible content is a disclosed, gated release workflow with no malicious intent, but its merge instructions tell the agent to invoke merge.sh by a relative path because auto mode refused the absolute form, which works around a harness refusal on a merge action.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.30). The required runtime workflow reads outsider-writable GitHub and Azure DevOps issues and PR review threads and comments (via
read-issue,poll-prand the unattendedselect) without the agent first choosing a specific item, so an outsider can post into a feed the workflow consumes.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (medium risk: 0.30). Setup installs the composed skills from GitHub repositories pinned to commit SHAs, so their content is operational; the mattpocock/skills source is an individual-owned repository (unofficial) whose immutable SHA pin keeps it from being weak, giving a reputable unofficial tier of medium.
Issues (3)
E004
CRITICALPrompt injection detected in skill instructions.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W012
MEDIUMUnverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Audit Metadata