giggle-seedance2-gen
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The script
scripts/generation_api.pymodifies shell startup profiles such as~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc, and~/.profile. It appends or updates an export command for theGIGGLE_API_KEYto ensure the credential persists across terminal sessions. - Evidence: The
setup_api_keyfunction inscripts/generation_api.pyexplicitly writes to detected shell configuration paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest user-provided text prompts and external resource URLs (images, videos, and audio) for processing by an LLM-based video generation engine. This architecture is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the fetched external data.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptargument and media URLs provided through--images,--videos, and--audiosinscripts/generation_api.py. - Capability inventory: The script performs network requests, writes to the home directory (
~/.giggle_api_key), and modifies shell configuration files. - Sanitization: The skill does not appear to perform sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external URLs before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent and user to execute a Python script (
scripts/generation_api.py) to interact with the external API. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiple command-line examples for setting up the environment and generating video. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script reads a stored API key from
~/.giggle_api_keyand transmits it via HTTP headers tohttps://giggle.profor authentication. - Evidence: The
SeedanceClientclass inscripts/generation_api.pymanages these network operations. - Context: The destination domain is a vendor-owned resource associated with the skill author, representing intended functionality.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata