codex-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/launch-run.shscript dynamically creates a wrapper shell script (run.sh) at runtime, modifies its permissions withchmod +x, and executes it. This wrapper script handles the setup and execution of thecodexCLI. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill uses
setsidorperl'sPOSIX::setsid()to launch delegated tasks in a new session. This detaches the task from the host harness (such as Claude Code or Cursor), allowing it to continue running even after the parent process terminates or the communication turn ends. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system utilities including
opensslfor random ID generation,mkdir,cp,bash, and the primarycodexCLI tool for task execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process "mission packets"—external markdown files containing goals and instructions. This architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the packets are generated from untrusted data, as they directly control the behavior and tool usage of the delegated agent. Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points:
prompt.mdfile copied from external--packetinput. - Boundary markers:
prompt-packet.mdtemplate includes explicit 'Scope', 'Judgment authority', and 'Authority and pause conditions' sections. - Capability inventory:
codex exechas access to tools, filesystem (workspace-write), and optional network access. - Sanitization: No explicit content filtering or sanitization of packet data is performed by the skill.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a
--network-accessflag which, when enabled, allows the delegated task to perform network operations from within aworkspace-writesandbox. This capability could be leveraged to exfiltrate data from the workspace if a malicious mission packet is processed.
Audit Metadata