orchestrate-subagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill design facilitates the processing and redistribution of untrusted user-supplied objectives to subagents, presenting an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: User-defined objectives, task descriptions, and constraints are interpolated into structured "prompt packets" (defined in
references/prompt-packets.md) for subagents. - Boundary markers: The templates for subagent delegation do not include robust delimiters or specific instructions to isolate interpolated user data from the subagent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill orchestrates subagents with the capability to perform codebase modifications (
references/delegation-patterns.md, Pattern E) and interact with various agent harnesses like Codex and Claude Code (references/harness-adapters.md). - Sanitization: There are no defined mechanisms within the orchestration workflow to validate, escape, or sanitize external content before it is processed by the subagent wave.
Audit Metadata